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There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s 
referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names.  With 
respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting 
intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The 
problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex 
definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature.  On the other hand there 
have been attempts to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the 
most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in 
his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the 
position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have 
conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one 
but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction 
based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term (captured by Kripke), and an epistemic 
one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the 
issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to 
the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that 
he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite 




I. Donnellan’s Distinction and Kripke’s Argument 
 
In his classic article “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, Keith Donnellan 
distinguished between two different ways in which a definite description may be used by 
a speaker, a “referential” use and an “attributive” use, and claimed that the distinction 
poses problems for both Russell’s and Strawson’s semantic theories. Let us first 
remember Donnellan’s own formulation of the distinction early in the article: 
 
A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states 
something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a 
definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the 
description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about 
and states something about that person or thing. In the first case the definite 
description might be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert 
something about whatever or whoever fits that description; but in the referential 
use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job—calling 
attention to a person or thing—and in general any other device for doing the same 
job, another description or a name, would do as well. In the attributive use, the 
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attribute of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential 
use.  (1966, pp.146-47) 
 
In order to explicate the distinction further Donnellan gives the following example: 
 
…suppose that Jones has been charged with Smith’s murder and has been placed 
on trial. Imagine that there is a discussion of Jones’ odd behavior at his trial. We 
might sum up our impression of his behavior by saying “Smith’s murderer is 
insane.” If someone asks to whom we are referring, by using this description 
[“Smith’s murderer”], the answer here is “Jones.” This, I shall say, is a referential 
use of the definite description…Suppose [now] that we come upon poor Smith 
being foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing…we might exclaim, 
“Smith’s murderer is insane.”…This, I shall say, is an attributive use of the 
description. (1966, p.147)  
 
Almost every philosopher who has written on the topic has agreed with Donnellan about 
the significance of this distinction, and its popularity in years has even gone beyond 
philosophy. Most, if not all, of the literature on the topic has concentrated on the issue of 
whether this important linguistic phenomenon has any semantic significance, as 
Donnellan claims. In what follows I will put this issue aside, and concentrate on how the 
referential/attributive distinction applies to the uses of complex descriptions (i.e. definite 
descriptions that have one or more singular terms embedded within them) and the uses of 
proper names. As we will see the uses of such singular terms is specifically problematic 
in that we seem to have conflicting intuitions about whether they fall on the referential or 
the attributive side. The discussion will reveal that there are two separate distinctions to 
be drawn from Donnellan’s examples, which in effect will explain why we seem to have 
conflicting intuitions in such cases. And then I will argue that the question of whether 
there are attributive uses of proper names acquires great epistemic value, when the 
question is taken in a certain way. 
The first to argue against the semantic significance of the distinction was Saul 
Kripke. One of Kripke’s arguments makes use of an extension of the distinction to the 
use of proper names.  The argument is simple and appears to be very striking. Most 
authors on the topic later have taken for granted, or at least did not question, the claim 
that there can be both a referential and an attributive use of a proper name.1   
In arguing against Donnellan, Kripke making use of Grice’s work distinguishes 
between the semantic referent of a term and the speaker’s referent in using that term in a 
context: 
 
In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is 
given by a general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever 
the designator is used. The speaker’s referent is given by a specific intention, on a 
given occasion, to refer to a certain object…My hypothesis is that Donnellan’s 
referential-attributive distinction should be generalized in this light…In one case 
(the “simple” case), his specific intention is simply to refer to the semantic 
referent; that is, his specific intention is simply his general semantic 
intention…Alternatively—the “complex” case—he has a specific intention, which 
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is distinct from his general intention, but which he believes, as a matter of fact, to 
determine the same object as the one determined by his general intention.2 (1979, 
pp.173-74) 
 
 Kripke then goes on to argue that such a linguistic phenomenon, though it 
genuinely exists in natural languages, cannot be used to refute Russell’s  (or any other 
semantic) theory. To claim that it does, on Kripke’ view, is to hold that the two uses of 
definite descriptions lead to a semantic ambiguity; Russell’s theory provides a semantic 
analysis of a sentence with a definite description in it, and according to Kripke, to claim 
that such a sentence “has two distinct analyses is to attribute a semantic…ambiguity” to 
it.3 
 In order to show that the two uses of definite descriptions do not lead to a 
semantic ambiguity, Kripke argues that the distinction applies to the use of proper names 
as well where it is easier to see how implausible this ambiguity-claim is.  To explicate 
this, Kripke gives the following example: Two friends are having a conversation about 
someone they see at a distance, whom they both take to be their friend Jones, when in 
fact it is their other friend Smith. One of them asks, “what is Jones doing?” and the other 
responds “raking the leaves.” Kripke notes: ““Jones,” in the common language of both, is 
a name of Jones; it never names Smith.”(p.173)  Kripke claims that in the idiolect of both 
speakers the semantic referent of the name “Jones” is Jones, but they have referred to 
Smith on this particular occasion by using the name. Thus we have a case where the 
speaker’s reference diverges from the semantic reference, i.e. a “complex” case, thus a 
referential use. From this observation, Kripke concludes that Donnellan’s distinction 
applies to the use of proper names. However, it is not at all clear that Donnellan would be 
convinced by Kripke’s argument. For all that Kripke has shown is that a name can be 
misapplied, which is indicative of a referential use. It is not at all obvious that if the two 
friends had not misapplied the name, and had intended to refer to Jones by their use of 
the name “Jones”, then we would get an attributive use, on Donnellan’s view. The 
phenomenon that Kripke cites does not seem to differ from two uses of definite 
descriptions, both of which are referential. The fact that the speaker’s referent and the 
semantic referent overlap on a particular use of a term, is not sufficient to conclude that 
the use of the term is attributive, for such may also be the case in the referential uses. In 
Donnellan’s example of the referential use, the speaker uses the description “Smith’s 
murderer” intending to refer to Jones (who is acting oddly in trial), and whether Jones is 
or is not the actual murderer is irrelevant here: in either case we get a referential use. 
Similarly Donnellan may claim that if the two friends in Kripke’s example had not been 
mistaken about the identity of the person whom they wished to talk about, we would not 
get an attributive use of a name, but we would again get a referential use, though this 
time applied correctly. 4     
 Ordinary uses of proper names, on Donnellan’s account, seem to fall on the 
referential side rather than the attributive side, for in normal cases a speaker uses a proper 
name “…to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about…” 
(Donnellan, 1966, p.146) It does look as if Kripke holds the opposite view, and takes 
ordinary uses of proper names to be attributive uses in his “Speaker’s Reference and 
Semantic Reference”. However in Naming and Necessity he seems to hold exactly the 
opposite. In challenging the Frege-Russell view that ordinary proper names have 
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descriptional content, Kripke argues that the name “Gödel” cannot be synonymous with 
the description “the man who proved the incompleteness theorem”. If Gödel had been a 
fraud, says Kripke, and someone else named “Schmidt” had actually proved the theorem, 
we would still be referring to Gödel and not Schmidt in using the name “Gödel”. Later he 
admits that there may be some exceptional cases: 
 
But, if we say, ‘Gödel relied on a diagonal argument in this step of the proof,’ 
don’t we here, perhaps, refer to whoever proved the theorem?…By analogy to 
Donnellan’s usage for descriptions, this might be called an “attributive” use of 
proper names. (1972, p.85, f.n.36, italics mine)  
 
 Now one would have expected Kripke to say just the opposite, for given Kripke’s 
own formulation, the use of the name “Gödel” in such a context would seem to fall under 
his complex case and not his simple case, and thus should be an example of a referential 
use. The speaker intends to refer to whoever proved the incompleteness theorem even if it 
turns out not to be Gödel, which indicates that his “specific intention” to refer to the 
person who proved the theorem is distinct from his “general intention” to refer to Gödel.  
In fact within the hypothetical scenario that Kripke considers, the two intentions 
determine different people, for if it is Schmidt and not Gödel who has proved the 
theorem, the speaker’s primary intention in using the name “Gödel” is not to refer to 
Gödel. Nevertheless the semantic referent of the name “Gödel” is still Gödel, even in the 
hypothetical scenario, and that is exactly what the argument is supposed to show. The 
speaker’s referent (who is Schmidt, i.e. the man who proved the theorem) and the 
semantic referent (who is Gödel) do not coincide, so we have a case in which the specific 
intention to refer to the speaker’s referent diverges from the general intention to refer to 
the semantic referent. This clearly looks like Kripke’s complex case, and thus should be a 
referential use on his account. 
 Now we should not immediately charge Kripke of inconsistency here. As I will 
argue later, there is not one but two separate distinctions to be drawn from Donnellan’s 
examples, and Kripke appealed to one of them in his (1972) and the other one in his 
(1979).   
  
 
II. The Near and Wild Misses 
 
Donnellan initially characterizes an attributive use of a definite description as a use in 
which the speaker “wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits that 
description.” (1966, p.146)  No doubt, this is good textual evidence for Kripke’s 
formulation. However, it is not at all clear that Donnellan wished to be as strict about this 
criterion as Kripke has taken him to be. In reply to one of his critics, Donnellan does talk 
about possible attributive uses where the speaker does not have the intention to talk about 
exactly whatever or whoever fits that description, and thus does not have the intention to 
talk about the semantic referent: 
 
In one example of the attributive use in my paper, a person upon finding the body 
of his friend Smith exclaims, “Smith’s murderer is insane.” In the example, the 
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speaker had no particular person in mind as Smith’s murderer…suppose that 
while Smith did die of natural causes, he has indeed been assaulted before death 
and that the evidence that led the speaker to attribute insanity to “Smith’s 
murderer” is still good evidence that his assailant is insane. In a sense the speaker 
has scored a “near miss.”…A near miss occurs with an attributive use when 
nothing exactly fits the description used, but some individual or other does fit a 
description in some sense close in meaning to the one used…Only in the 
referential use can a speaker have “missed by a mile,” because only that use 
involves a particular entity that the description either fits neatly, just misses, or 
wildly misses. Once this is seen, taking near misses into account does not blur the 
distinction. If anything, it helps one to see what the distinction is. (1968, p.210)  
 
 As the passage clearly indicates, the so-called “near misses” can occur in the 
attributive use, and only in the case of a referential use can one “miss wildly”.  I believe 
it is exactly here that we run into problems, for there are cases of “wild misses” that 
could not be classified as referential uses and have strong attributive flavor. The least 
important of such cases is when the speaker has a slip of the tongue: given the tragic 
situation the speaker says “Sam’s murderer is insane”, intending to refer to Smith’s 
murderer (attributively) and not Sam’s. Given that this is definitely a wild miss it cannot 
be the attributive use, if we take the above quoted passage seriously. On Kripke’s 
formulation though, it turns out to be a complex case and thus a referential use. So a 
simple slip of the tongue is good enough to turn a genuine attributive use into a 
referential use on Kripke’s account.  
 There are other more important cases that seem to be problematic, for example 
the use of complex descriptions, i.e. definite descriptions that have singular terms i.e. 
proper names, pronouns, or other definite descriptions embedded in them. Consider this 
extended version of Donnellan’s Smith case: Jones, who is actually innocent, is on trial 
for the murder of Smith. One day as he is being brought to court, someone in the crowd 
opens fire and kills Jones. The murderer (of Jones) manages to escape. After the ballistic 
report reveals that Jones was shot by a Smith and Wesson gun, the prosecutor says: “The 
gun that killed Smith’s murderer was a Smith and Wesson, but the police have not been 
able to find the weapon yet.”  The use of the complex description “the gun that killed 
Smith’s murderer” by the prosecutor seems to be attributive. Though Jones was not 
Smith’s murderer, by using the embedded description “Smith’s murderer” the prosecutor 
had the intention to refer to Jones. In using the larger description “the gun that killed 
Smith’s murderer” the prosecutor’s primary intention was to talk about the gun that killed 
Jones, and not whatever fits the description. If we take the use of the larger description to 
be attributive, then it would be wrong to hold that only in the referential use can the 
speaker “miss by a mile”. If we generalize this case, we may say that a complex definite 
description of the form “the F which is the G” can be used by a speaker in such a way 
that while the outermost descriptional function “the F which is___” is used attributively, 
the embedded description “the G” is used referentially (or vice versa). Furthermore we 
can get even more complicated cases if we consider definite descriptions that have more 
than one singular term embedded in them. In such cases speakers may have various kinds 
of intentions regarding the use of each embedded definite description. If the speaker, in 
using such a complex definite description, intends to refer to a particular object that he 
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has “in mind”, then no matter how long the definite description is, we can easily say that 
such a use is referential; however if there is no such intention, and the outermost 
descriptional function is used attributively, then it is not clear what we should say. In fact 
even Donnellan’s own example, with a slight modification, will pose the same kind of 
difficulty. Suppose that the speaker misidentifies the person whose dead body he comes 
across when he says “Smith’s murderer is insane”, and it is actually Brown, and not 
Smith whose body that the speaker sees. If the speaker’s primary intention is to attribute 
insanity to the murderer of the person whose dead body he has observed, then clearly he 
wishes to talk about Brown’s murderer, and it is irrelevant whether Smith has also been 
murdered. Thus the use of the description “Smith’s murderer” in this particular case is 
not a referential use since the speaker has no particular murderer in mind. But the speaker 
also does not intend to refer to whoever fits the description. Again the use of the 
description does seem to have a very strong attributive flavor, but the speaker has missed 
by a mile. 
 If we take what Donnellan says at face value, then we would have to claim that 
such uses are neither referential nor attributive. Prima facie this may not seem to be a 
problem, for as Kripke points out, the distinction is not supposed to be exhaustive. There 
are, no doubt, certain contexts in which a speaker, in using a definite description in an 
utterance, may have no intention to refer, and even believe that the description has no 
referent. One who believes, for instance, that there is no tenth planet, could assert “some 
scientists wrongly believe that the tenth planet has been discovered”.  In such a case, it 
could perhaps be said that the speaker uses the description “the tenth planet” neither 
referentially nor attributively.5  But clearly the cases that are given above are cases in 
which the speaker does use the singular term as a designator, in its Fregean customary 
mode, so saying that they are neither referential nor attributive seems to be problematic. 
It is not clear what we should do with such examples, and it does not seem that 
Donnellan’s texts are of great help. What is worse is that complex definite descriptions 
are not a rare variety in language. In fact apart from the use of the so-called incomplete 
descriptions, almost all definite descriptions used in languages are complex, so leaving 
them out of the picture would considerably limit the application of Donnellan’s 
distinction, thus reducing its theoretical significance.  
I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting  intuitions about whether the 
use of “Smith’s murderer” is referential or attributive when the speaker intends to talk 
about Sam’s murderer and does not have any particular murderer in mind, is that there 
are two separate distinctions to be made between the so-called “referential” and 
“attributive” uses based on different criteria. This will also explain why Kripke made 
seemingly contradictory statements about “the attributive use of proper names”, for there 
is a plausible reading of Donnellan which suggests that ordinary uses of proper names (as 
well other singular terms such as demonstratives and personal pronouns) are attributive 
and another equally plausible reading in which they turn out to be referential.  
 
III. The Pragmatic and the Epistemic Distinction  
 
For those who are more interested in the issues of pragmatics concerning how one may 
refer to an object even when his words do not, we could distinguish between referential 
and attributive uses of terms by using Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference 
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and semantic reference as he has suggested. Let us call such uses “referential1” and 
“attributive1”.However if we are more involved with epistemic issues, then we must put 
aside Kripke’s formulation, and try to make another distinction in terms of having an 
object in mind in some qualified epistemic sense. Such a distinction is motivated by 
Donnellan’s examples: in all the cases he gives for “the referential use” of a term the 
speaker has an object in mind that he wishes to talk about, whereas in all the cases he 
gives for “the attributive use” the speaker has no object in mind in using the term. This 
suggests another way to make the distinction between “the referential and the attributive 
uses of terms”: if a speaker in using a term (in its customary mode) has an object in mind 
that he wishes to refer to, then that use of the term is “referential2”; if the speaker in using 
a term (in its customary mode) has no object in mind that he wishes to refer to, then that 
use of the term is “attributive2”.  
 
Now we may raise the crucial question: are there attributive2 uses of proper 
names? The answer to this question, partially depends on what the conditions are for one 
to have an object in mind, but before trying to clarify those conditions, let us look at  
Boer’s example of a use of a proper name that would seem to be attributive2: 
  
Let us suppose that the police are attempting to destroy a certain drug-ring. They 
have some evidence that the ring is headed by a single man but have as yet been 
unable to discover his identity. In the course of their investigations, the police are 
apt to say things like: the leader of the drug-ring has high political connections. 
The italicized description…is most naturally construed as attributive…Imagine 
further that the police, after interrogating a minor member of the ring, learn that 
low-ranking affiliates of the syndicate, who do not know the identity of their 
leader, call him ‘Mr. Heroin’. Since ‘Mr. Heroin’ is a conveniently short 
expression, the police themselves adopt it…Now I would argue that the name 
‘Mr. Heroin’, as used by the police…is merely convenient shorthand for the 
attributive description [the leader of the drug-ring]… (1978, p. 179) 
 
The fact that Boer gives such an example of an “attributive” use of a proper name, is 
surely a good sign that he takes ordinary uses of proper names as being “referential”, 
which suggests that he takes Donnellan’s distinction to be between the referential2 and 
the attributive2 uses of terms (and not between the referential1 and the attributive1). It is 
beacuse the police are using the name ‘Mr. Heroin’ without having anyone in mind that 
makes the use of the name attributive2.6  However this would not be sufficient for 
Donnellan to accept such a use as a genuine case in which a proper name is used 
attributively2, for given his commitment to the Direct Reference Theory any use of a 
proper name as a shorthand for a description is really not a use of it as a genuine proper 
name at all. So at most what such examples would show is that a name in certain contexts 
may abbreviate a definite description used attributively2.  
In arguing against the so-called Descriptional Theory of Proper Names, Kripke 
claims that even when a proper name is introduced into a language by description (and 
not by ostension) the name does not become synonymous with the description: the 
description fixes the reference but not the meaning of the name.  Kripke argues that the 
proper name introduced in such a way becomes a rigid designator though the reference-
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fixing description may not be. So following Kripke, the only way in which it seems 
possible to get such an attributive2 use of a proper name would be by introducing a name 
by fixing its referent with an attributive2 use of a definite description that refers to an 
object that the reference-fixer does not have in mind. Though we may perhaps use Boer’s 
example with some modification, another case that Donnellan and Kripke have debated 
over concerns the name “Neptune” as it may have been introduced by LeVerrier and 
Adams before the planet was discovered. At the time the description “the planet causing 
the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus” or something close to it may have been used by 
LeVerrier and Adams attributively2. They of course intended to talk about that planet, 
whichever it is, that is responsible for those perturbations, and there is a sense in which 
they did not have any particular heavenly body in mind which they believed to be this 
planet. So, following Kripke, if we hold that a genuine name can be introduced into our 
language by description, then we do get possible attributive2 uses of proper names. 
 Making use of the Neptune case, Kripke not only claims that the name cannot be 
simply a shorthand for the description, but also, that this gives rise to the possibility of 
contingent truths that are a priori. He claims that Le Verrier could have introduced the 
name “Neptune” by fixing its referent by the description “the planet causing the 
perturbations in the orbit of Uranus”, and by this act of linguistic stipulation, he thereby 
could have known without appealing to experience that if there is such a planet, then it is 
Neptune. What is peculiar is that Donnellan, in arguing against Kripke on the possibility 
of having contingent a priori truths, rules out such attributive2 uses of proper names 
altogether without mentioning his own distinction. He argues that even if Le Verrier 
introduced a name as a rigid designator in such a way, it does not follow that he could 
have known the target proposition for he could not have “used the name”.  Similarly, 
argues Donnellan, if we introduce the name “Newman 1” as the name of the first baby to 
be born at the turn of the century, we would not thereby know, without any further 
experience, that Newman 1 will be the first baby to be born at the turn of the century. 
Again, the name “Newman 1”, on Donnellan’s view, can not be used by the reference-
fixer, at least not as a genuine proper name. That is presumably because the reference-
fixer has no particular person in mind in attempting to use the name “Newman 1”, though 
Donnellan never explicitly states this. On his account it seems to follow that the 
epistemic condition for a speaker to use a name as a genuine name is that he or she must 
have an object in mind. Kripke, on the other hand, seems to deny this. Neither Donnellan 
nor Kripke mention the referential/attributive distinction in their debate, but it is clear 
that the possibility of using a proper name in a genuine way, and not as a disguised 
description, without having an object in mind is ruled out by Donnellan and assumed 
(with no argument) by Kripke.  
 
IV. Conditions for De Re Attitudes 
 
 
 On Donnellan’s view introducing a name by description does not automatically 
put us in a privileged position to use the name as a rigid designator. In the Neptune case 
he holds that Le Verrier could not have known that Neptune was the cause of certain 
perturbations before the planet was discovered, given that he could not have used the 
name “Neptune” as a rigid designator. Hence the refutation of the contingent a priori. In 
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order to support this thesis he first considers the name “Newman 1” introduced to rigidly 
designate the first baby to be born at the turn of the century. Donnellan admits that the 
sentence “Newman 1 will be the first baby to be born at the turn of the century” may then 
in fact express a contingent truth. However, it does not follow, on Donnellan’s account, 
that we would thereby be in a position to know the truth expressed by this sentence, let 
alone know it a priori. Let us consider his argument (rolling the time back to the 70s): 
 
Let us now imagine that just after midnight on New Century’s Eve a child is born 
who is firmly established to be the first born of the century. He is baptized 
“John”, but those of us who are still around, remembering our stipulation, also 
call this child ‘Newman 1.’ Now it seems to me that it would be outrageous to say 
that some twenty-five years or so before his birth, we knew that John would be 
the first child born in the 21st century. Suppose one of us, living to a ripe old age, 
were to meet John after he has grown up a bit. Would it be true to say to John, “I 
call you ‘Newman 1’ and Newman 1, I knew some twenty-five years or so before 
your birth that you would be the first child born in the 21st century”? (1979, p.53) 
 
 
In this passage Donnellan is appealing to a certain intuition that most of us would seem to 
share, but whether that intuition alone (that it would be wrong to go up to John and say “I 
knew that you would be the first born child…”) is sufficient to infer that there is no de re 
knowledge of Newman 1 (at the time) is not altogether clear. What we need is a general 
principle which Donnellan formulates as follows: 
 
If one has a name for a person, say “N”, and there is a bit of knowledge that one 
would express by saying “N is φ”, then if one subsequently meets the person it 
will be true to say to him, using the second person pronoun, “I knew that you 
were φ.” (1979, p.55).7 
 
Let us put aside the issue of whether based on this principle Donnellan has succeeded in 
refuting Kripke’s case for the contingent a priori. What is more relevant is that 
Donnellan not only holds that there is no knowledge expressed in such cases, but also 
that the reference-fixer cannot use the proper name as a device for reference: 
 
…the fact that a name is introduced as a rigid designator does not by itself put a 
person in a position to have de re propositional attitudes toward the entity rigidly 
designated. For essentially the same considerations that were adduced for denying 
that there was knowledge of an entity just in virtue of the sort of stipulation that 
introduces a rigid designator by means of a description can be applied to the other 
propositional attitudes. It would, for example, seem to me just as incorrect to say 
to John…, “I believed about you some twenty-five years before your birth…,” “I 
asserted about you some twenty-five years before your birth…,” etc. (1979, 
pp.56-57)  
 
 Though Donnellan does not explicitly say so, another de re attitude no doubt 
would be to refer to or to talk about, for, on the same grounds, it would equally be wrong 
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to go up to John and say “I talked about you some twenty-five years ago…”, “I referred 
to you some twenty-five years ago …” as well. Such names are simply not “usable” 
according to Donnellan: 
 
…we are in the somewhat odd position of possessing a mechanism for 
introducing a name that rigidly designates something, but a mechanism that is not 
powerful enough to allow us to use the name!” (1979, p.57) 
 
 
 From all this can we conclude that there is no attributive2 use of proper names for 
Donnellan? Not just yet, for Donnellan’s account does not immediately rule out the 
possible attributive2 uses of names of entities which are abbreviated rigid definite 
descriptions. If the name ‘π’, for instance, is merely a shorthand for the description “the 
ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter”, the name may be used as a rigid 
designator. Some may claim, on the other hand, that the name ‘π’ is a referential device 
we use to refer to a particular number which we have in mind, making our use 
referential2, arguing that we have some knowledge of that number, independent of what 
we can derive from the description. Though I am inclined not to hold such a position, 
there are other less controversial cases, in which we attempt to name a number that we do 
not have in mind in any sense. In fact Donnellan claims that his considerations regarding 
the “Neptune” and “Newman 1”cases apply to mathematical entities such as numbers as 
well, and gives the following example: 
 
Although I know that the 98th prime number is not divisible by three, it does not 
follow that I know about the number which is the 98th prime number that it is not 
divisible by three. (1979, p.54)     
 
It is plausible to hold that one who does not know what the 98th prime number is, does 
not have a particular number in mind which he knows to be the 98th prime number. 
Suppose now that we introduce the name ‘P98’ as the name of the 98th prime number8, 
and use it in an utterance. If the name is merely a shorthand for the description, the name 
could be used attributively2, just as in Boer’s example. But again the issue of whether 
there are attributive2 uses of proper names would lose its epistemic significance then. 
Only when the name is used as a genuine name, and not as a disguised description, 
(regardless of whether it is a rigid designator) would Donnellan’s epistemic claims make 
sense. In fact he does make this point: 
 
I make the assumption that the knowledge, if we have it, would have to be de re 
not simply on the grounds that “Newman 1” is a rigid designator. It does not 
follow from the fact that a term is a rigid designator that when it enters into a 
statement of propositional attitude, the attitude ascribed must be de re…It is 
rather,…that as these stipulations introduce names they give the names no 
descriptive content that leads me to say that the knowledge, if there is any, must 
be de re…(1979, p.54) 
 
İnan, İlhan, "The Referential’ and ‘the Attributive’: Two Distinctions for the Price of One”, 137-160, 
Organon F, Vol.XIII (2), (A&HCI), 2006.  
 A genuine use of a proper name expresses de re attitudes of the speaker, not just 
because the name is used as a rigid designator, but also because it is used with no 
descriptive content. As I understand Donnellan, his position entails that there is no 
attributive2 use of a proper name used in a genuine Russellian way, i.e. as a directly 
referential device with no descriptive content. On Donnellan’s view a singular term used 
referentially2 by a speaker expresses de re attitudes of the speaker about the object the 
speaker has in mind in using that term, whereas a singular term used attributively2 in a 
sentence by a speaker expresses only de dicto attitudes of the speaker concerning the 
proposition expressed by that sentence. Furthermore, a proper name, on his account, 
cannot be used as a genuine name by a speaker unless the speaker has de re attitudes 
about the object he wishes to talk about in using that name. Therefore, it follows that a 
proper name according to Donnellan, cannot be used attributively2.  
All of this, however, hinges upon what it takes for a speaker to have an object in 
mind, and Donnellan does not provide us with any account of this. That is presumably 
why Kaplan complained that “the notion of having someone in mind is not analyzed but 
used” (1978, p. 222). In fact Kaplan had already given his own criteria for having de re 
attitudes towards a certain object in his (1968). Donnellan addresses the issue in a brief 
passage. 
 
In “Quantifying In,” Kaplan held that in order to have de re propositional attitude 
toward an entity one must be, as he put it, en rapport with it. And he thought that 
being en rapport involved three things: One must possess a name that (1) denoted 
the entity, (2) is for the user a “vivid” name and (3) in a technical sense, is a name 
for the speaker of  the object…I am inclined to drop Kaplan’s first two 
requirements and try to go with some variant of this third condition as being what 
is required for a name to be a name that a speaker can use to assert de re 
something about an entity. (1979, p.58) 
  
How does the notion of having an object in mind  relate to the notion of possessing a 
name that is the name of an object? Would it be correct to say, for instance, that in order 
for a speaker to possess a name that is a name of an object, the speaker must have the 
object in mind? If so, we conclude, once again, that an attributive2 use of a proper name 
is impossible on Donnellan’s view. In any case the notion of  possessing a name that is 
the name of an object is no clearer than the notion of having an object in mind, so 
analyzing the latter by appealing to the former is no progress. 
 
V. Causal Connection  
 
 In ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’ Donnellan argues that a speaker 
by using a proper name may refer to an object  in virtue of a causal historical chain 
starting from the initial baptism of the object named and the particular use of the name by 
the speaker. This view, advocated by Kripke, Evans and others as well, is at times called 
the ‘Causal Theory of Proper Names’, though both Donnellan and Kripke have been 
reluctant to call the view a “theory” for various reasons. In any case what is relevant for 
our purposes is that a certain implication of this view, on Donnellan’s account, is that a 
speaker need not always have an identifying description of the object he wishes to talk 
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about. In one example in ‘Speaking of Nothing’ he argues that someone whose only 
belief about Thales is that he was a Greek philosopher who held that all is water, may in 
fact refer to Thales, even if it turns out that there was no such philosopher who held such 
a view. For all we know, Thales may turn out to be a well digger, not a philosopher, who 
ironically remarked that he wished that all was water so that he wouldn’t have to keep 
digging new wells. As the story was passed on from one generation to another, we came 
to believe that Thales in fact was a philosopher who held this weird theory. If we further 
suppose that unbeknownst to us, there was in fact a Greek philosopher who held such a 
view to whom we have no causal connection, we would still be referring to the well 
digger and not to the philosopher. It is a certain kind of historical causal chain, going 
back from the utterance of the name “Thales” to Thales himself, that accounts for the fact 
that the speaker could refer despite the fact that he has no identifying description of the 
man.  In the mouth of this ignorant user the name “Thales” is a name of Thales. All this 
seems to be in the spirit of the direct reference theory that Donnellan advocated. 
However, given that Donnellan also endorses the thesis that in order for a speaker to refer 
to an object he must have the “object in mind”,  it would seem to follow that on 
Donnellan’s view one can refer to an object he has in mind without having any 
identifying description of that object. 
 It seems to me that there is great tension here. How is it possible to have an object 
in mind without knowing any identifying properties of that object? After all if I do not 
possess any identifying descriptions of Thales, it may even turn out that all the beliefs I 
express by using the name “Thales” are false, save for some trivial analytic truths. 
Following Donnellan, it may turn out that Thales was not a philosopher, never wrote or 
even read philosophy, in fact was not named “Thales” in his lifetime etc. It may even turn 
out that Thales was not a male, but a female, or even perhaps an alien or a robot, 
indicating that we know nothing about Thales, save perhaps that it was an object of some 
sort that is the referent of the name. Even in such a case, still I could have him (her/it)  in 
my mind, given Donnellan’s views. Given that I have no correctly identifying 
description, nor a non-verbal form of representation of Thales, it is not at all clear what 
would explain the fact that I have him in my mind.  
On the other hand, if all that it takes for a speaker to have an object in mind and 
have de re attitudes towards it, is for that speaker to have a causal connection to that 
object, then it is not at all clear why Le Verrier did not have de re attitudes towards 
Neptune. After all a speaker who uses the name “Thales” without having any identifying 
description of Thales would seem to have a more remote causal connection to Thales 
than the causal connection Le Verrier had to Neptune. Clearly Le Verrier’s intention to 
refer to the undiscovered planet was partially caused by the observations he had made 
regarding the orbit of Uranus which was causally affected by Neptune.9 No doubt he also 
needed Newton’s theory as well to come to believe that there was an undiscovered 
planet, but even if Newton’s theory was not totally correct it still was a fact that an 
undiscovered planet was perturbing Uranus.  
 It seems to me that it is one thing to have an object in mind, and quite another to 
have some causal connection to it. Whatever intuitive sense we attach to these locutions, 
the former would have to involve an internalist component, predominantly related to how 
a speaker represents the object in question in his mind, whereas the latter is a basically an 
externalist notion predominantly related to a series of causal events most of which take 
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place outside the speaker’s mind. There may be times when we know that we have a 
certain causal connection to some entity, without knowing what object that is or without 
having that object in mind. Le Verrier, for instance, could have said truthfully that he had 
some causal connection to Neptune, but did not have any particular planet in mind that he 
knew to be Neptune. Similarly we know today that there is a cause why dinosaurs 
became extinct, but we do not know what that cause is. A speaker’s use of the term “the 
cause of the extinction of dinosaurs”, could be historically linked to a chain of events that 
go all the way back to the extinction of the dinosaurs, even if that speaker has no specific 
cause in mind that he knows to be responsible for the extinction of this animal.  Again, 
when the police were using the name “Unabomber” they had no specific murderer in 
mind, though they did have a causal connection to him through his acts of violence. So I 
wish to conclude that having an identifying description of an object or even a causal 
connection to it is not sufficient to have the object in mind. Something more intimate is 
needed.  
   
  
 
V. Having an Object in Mind 
 
 No doubt the notion of having an object in mind is vague; but what is worse is 
that it also seems to be context-dependent. If detective Jones comes across the dead body 
of Smith and does not know who the murderer is, he could perhaps correctly say, that he 
has no one in mind whom he knows to be the murderer of Smith. But then suppose he has 
the following conversation with his detective friend Mark: 
Jones: I am trying to catch a murderer and I need your help. 
Mark: Do you want to catch any old murderer to get a promotion, or do you have a 
particular murderer in mind? 
Jones: No, I am not after a promotion, I do have a particular one in mind, it’s Smith’s 
murderer. 
So then it would seem that whether Jones has “anyone in mind” would depend on 
the interests of the conversing parties and other contextual features of the discourse, 
making the notion epistemically futile.10  But clearly this would be doing injustice to 
Donnellan. On a more charitable reading, we could suggest that, on Donnellan’s view, to 
have an object in mind one needs to have a certain form of experience of the object in 
question. The paradigm case is of course sense perception. It is clear that the medium 
sized objects which we perceive are objects of experience that we have in mind, as 
evidenced by the fact that all the examples that Donnellan gives for the referential use, 
are ones in which the speaker intends to refer to an object that he sees. But sense 
experience, is no doubt a very limited category, for there are many objects of which we 
have knowledge of, only through the testimony of others. If having a sense experience of 
an object had been a necessary condition to have that object in mind, then it would follow 
that I can not have Pluto, or China, or Socrates, in mind, given that I have never seen 
them. This would not be in line with Donnellan’s intent, given that ordinary proper 
names are used referentially on his account.  What is even more problematic are abstract 
entities such as numbers. What kind of experience is needed to have the number 3 in 
mind? Would seeing an instance of it, say three apples, and recognizing that they are 
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three at a glance with no calculation be required? If so how could I have a larger number, 
say 17, in mind? I am not sure how we should go about answering these questions, but 
these are the kinds of questions that need to be addressed to give a useful epistemic 
account of the notion of having in mind.  
Furthermore, the notion of having an object in mind is bound to be vague, if we 
are to give an account of it in terms of the notion of experience, for the latter is a relative 
notion that admits of degrees. There could be cases in which it will be indeterminate 
whether an object would be considered as an object of experience for an individual, and 
such indeterminacy would carry over to the notion of having an object in mind as well.  
 Presumably this is why neither Donnellan, nor anyone else in the literature has 
attempted to lay down the necessary and sufficient conditions for one to have an object in 
mind. Though I will not attempt to do so either, I believe that a further step can be taken 
in the right direction. What I will propose will not amount to strictly distinguishing 
criteria, but rather a symptom of what it takes to have an object in mind. In using a 
singular term in an assertion as a designator, we at times are curious as to what that term 
refers to, and yet at other times, we are not. When Holmes utters “Smith’s murderer is 
insane”, intending to talk about the unknown murderer, he is curious about the referent of 
“Smith’s murderer”, but when he asserts the same sentence in trial, intending to talk 
about Jones, whom he believes to be the murderer, he is not. In the former case, given his 
curiosity, we may say that Holmes has no murderer in mind, whereas in the latter case, 
given the absence of such a curiosity, we may say that he does. As a general rule of 
thumb, we may then say that if a speaker, in using a designator in an assertion (in its 
customary mode) is curious about what it is that he wishes to talk about by his use of that 
designator, then he has no object in mind which in effect makes the use of that designator 
in that assertion attributive2, if he is not, then he has an object in mind making the use 
referential2.   
 This, of course, only amounts to a symptom, not a strictly distinguishing criterion. 
It may well be the case that in certain contexts a speaker may use a definite description 
without having an object in mind, in some intuitive sense, yet not be curious as to what 
the description refers to. One may, for instance, assert that the shortest spy is a liar, 
without having any spy in mind, yet not be curious as to what the description “the 
shortest spy” refers to. Though, it could be argued that such a speaker, could bring 
himself to be curious if he sincerely reflects upon his epistemic link with the referent of 
his term. If were to ask him, “do you intend to talk about a particular spy whom you 
believe to be the shortest spy?” he would have to say “no” if he is sincere. So even if he 
is not curious about the referent of his term, he could be brought to be curious. Now of 
course it may be the case that we could be brought to be curious about the referent of any 
singular term, if we get into a skeptical attitude. Under normal conditions I am not 
curious as to what the term “the table in front of me” refers to, though if I can sincerely 
start doubting the existence of physical objects, I may perhaps bring myself to acquire 
such a curiosity. The situation about the shortest spy is different though; one could be 
brought to be curious about the referent of the term “the shortest spy” without the help of 
any Cartesian doubt.   
 I am not sure how satisfactory all of this is, though we could at least say that 
curiosity about the referent of a term used in an assertion, is a good symptom that the 
term is being used attributively2. Now let us look at the two problematic cases discussed 
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earlier, namely the use of complex definite descriptions, and the use of proper names. 
Suppose that when Holmes utters “the gun that killed Smith’s murderer is a Smith and 
Wesson, but we haven’t found it yet”, he uses the embedded description “Smith’s 
murderer” to talk about Jones whom he wrongly believes to be the murderer of Smith. 
There is a good sense in which he is not curious about whom he is referring to by the use 
of this term, however, in using the larger description “the gun that killed Smith’s 
murderer”, he is. As I indicated earlier, on Kripke’s account the use of the larger 
description turns out to be a complex case, making it referential1. But on the account now 
given it turns out to be attributive2. Now one may object to this by arguing that what 
Holmes is curious about is not the referent of the term “the gun that killed Smith’s 
murderer”, but rather, the referent of “the gun that killed Jones”, and given that in the 
scenario we are considering Jones is not Smith’s murderer, the two are not the same kind 
of curiosity. The objector may go on to argue that if we were to point out to Holmes that 
Jones is not Smith’s murderer, he would withdraw his description and use the correct one 
in its place, and conclude, from this, that Holmes was not in fact curious about the 
referent of the term “the gun that killed Smith’s murderer”. We may perhaps meet this 
objection by claiming that curiosity is closed under known implication. If Holmes is 
curious about the referent of “the gun that killed Jones”, and believes that Jones’s is 
Smith’s murderer, then by doing the simple inference, he would thereby be curious about 
the referent of “the gun that killed Smith’s murderer.” After he is corrected, he would no 
longer be curious about the referent of the latter, of course, but that is only after he is 
corrected, not when he makes his assertion.  As I said earlier the uses of complex definite 
descriptions as such seem to have a strong “attributive flavor”, and now we have a way to 
give an account of this intuition. In contrast with Kripke’s account, a complex definite 
description may be used attributively2 even when an embedded singular term within that 
description is used referentially2. 
In the light of this, we could say that our uses of ordinary proper names are 
referential2,  for our uses of proper names such as “Pluto” or “Socrates”, are usually not 
accompanied by a curiosity about what they refer to. However when the investigators, the 
media, and the concerned public were using the proper name “Unabomber”, there was, 
no doubt, a curiosity as to whom the name refers to. This I take to be  a good sign 
showing that in using an ordinary proper name, we have an object in mind that we wish 
to refer to, but in using an unusual name such as “Unabomber” we don’t.   Similarly there 
is a good contrast between the use of the name “Neptune” before and after the planet was 
discovered, given that we could hold, plausibly I think, that Le Verrier was curious about 
the referent of the name, but a competent speaker these days, who knows a bit astronomy, 
is not.   
  Once the referential/attributive distinction is formulated in this light, then the 
question of whether there are genuine attributive2 uses of proper names would seem to 
acquire great epistemic value. In the light of the above discussion, we may reformulate 
the question in this way: can a speaker use a proper name as a genuine name in an 
assertion, while being curious as to what that name refers to? If this is at all possible, it 
would follow that we may have de re curiosity about an object which we do not have in 
mind. As I have suggested Kripke is too generous and Donnellan is too restrictive with 
respect to their answers to this question. On Kripke’s position any proper name whose 
reference is fixed by a definite description could be used by the reference fixer to express 
İnan, İlhan, "The Referential’ and ‘the Attributive’: Two Distinctions for the Price of One”, 137-160, 
Organon F, Vol.XIII (2), (A&HCI), 2006.  
de re knowledge of the object, assuming that the object exists. That is the main premise 
of his argument for the contingent a priori. Donnellan, on the other hand, claims that 
such a name is simply not usable by the reference fixer and therefore no knowledge or 
any other de re propositional attitude may be expressed by the use of such a name. It 
seems to me that both positions are extreme. No doubt that common sense sides with 
Donnellan when he says that merely having an identifying description of an object is not 
sufficient to acquire de re attitudes about that object.  Even if we knew for certain that 
there will be a unique first baby born at the turn of the century, that alone would not be 
sufficient for us to acquire de re attitudes about such a person. Similarly the fact that we 
know that there must be a spy who is shorter than all other spies does not imply that we 
can have de re attitudes about the shortest spy. However, it also seems to me that Kripke 
is right when he claims that Le Verrier may have had de re knowledge of Neptune before 
the planet was discovered. After all Le Verrier not only had a description of the planet, 
but he had also made many careful observations of the orbit of Uranus which was 
perturbed by Neptune. Or taking Donnellan’s own example of an attributive use, when 
the detective observes the dead body and exclaims “Smith’s murderer is insane” he has 
more than a description at hand. Such cases are significantly different from the previous 
ones. In attempting to talk about the shortest spy all one may have in hand is a 
description and perhaps some background knowledge of spies, but in attempting to talk 
about Smith’s murderer the detective not only has a description and some background 
knowledge of murderers, but also a dead body right before him. Epistemically speaking 
that should make a whole lot of difference. Similarly proper names such as “Jack the 
Ripper”, “Unabomber”, “Sniper” were, I believe, used attributively2 to express de re 
attitudes toward certain unknown murderers. Again, if the hypothesis that our sun is a 
part of a binary star system is correct (given the excessive iridium found in the fossils), it 
may in fact be true that scientists have been expressing de re beliefs about this star when 
they used the name “Nemesis”. Assuming that the objects in question do in fact exist, 
speakers who use such names have more than a simple description at hand: they have 
access to empirical facts that are caused by the object in question. That is why I hold that 
in such cases an attributive2 use of a proper name could express de re attitudes of the 
speaker.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
 I have argued that there is not one but two different distinctions inherent in 
Donnellan’s discussion of the “referential” and “attributive” uses. One of them is 
captured by appealing to Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic 
reference, which is purely pragmatic in its nature; whereas the other one is captured by 
appealing to the notion of “having an object in mind” which is predominantly an 
epistemic one.  
As I have suggested the two distinctions give opposite results in the cases of the 
uses of certain complex descriptions and proper names. A complex description one of 
whose embedded singular terms is used referentially1 automatically turns out to be a 
referential1 use, whereas the same complex description turns out to be an attributive2 use 
if the speaker has no object in mind that he wishes to refer to in using that description. 
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On the other hand most ordinary uses of proper names turn out to be attributive1 
given that in using a proper name we normally intend to refer to the semantic referent of 
the name, whereas perhaps all uses of ordinary proper names turn out to be referential2, 
given that in using a proper name we normally wish to refer to an object we have in mind 
which in most cases is nothing but the semantic referent of the name. Now which of the 
two distinctions captures Donnellan’s intent? Perhaps neither. That is for Donnellan to 
clarify, though as a point of speculation I would suggest that he went back and forth 
between the two distinctions, never clearly separating them.  
 
 
1 Within the wide literature on Donnellan’s distinction there is very little discussion on this issue. Some 
have simply repeated Kripke’s argument and took it for granted that the distinction applies to the use of 
proper names. See Soames (1994) and Geurts (1997).    
2  Interestingly Kripke’s formulation leaves out the condition of “having an object in mind” altogether. It 
was Nathan Salmon who first pointed this out to me. See his (2004) for an extensive discussion of this 
point. 
3 I agree with Kripke that Donnellan’s argument does not threaten any semantic theory. Both Kripke and 
Salmon have given very convincing arguments to this effect. 
4 This confusion is also reflected in the literature. Geurts (1997) assumes with no argument that Kripke was 
able to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names. In response, Abbott (2002) claims that 
the “referential use…is the only kind of use proper names would have on Kripke’s nondescriptional 
analysis.” (p.196).  I agree with Abbott that it is not obvious that Kripke’s leaf-raker case does provide us 
with an attributive use of a proper name as Geurts takes for granted, but I do not agree with her that that 
was not Kripke’s intention and that a proper name can only be used referentially on Kripke’s view.  
5 Following Frege, it may also be argued that the speaker uses the descirption intending to refer not its 
customary referent but its indirect referent, namely its sense. Whether that would allow us to extend 
Donnellan’s distinction so that it applies to such contexts of use is an issue to be explored.   
6 An example of a possible attributive use of a proper name was given even earlier by Martinich (1977): if 
the chairman of a raffle committee draws the name of a certain Jane Smith as the winner of the grand prize 
and declares ‘Jane Smith has won the grand prize’, and he does not know anything about this person, then 
the use of the name by the chairman could perhaps be attributive.    
7 Some may wish to deny this principle and Donnellan does admit that there are certain exceptional cases. 
See fn.22 in his (1979). 
8 As I have discussed in  my (1997) this example also shows that the puzzle about the contingent a priori is 
not a puzzle merely about the contingent a priori, for very similar cases could occur in mathematics where 
nothing is contingent and all truths are a priori.  
9 I owe the idea that LeVerrier had a causal connection to Neptune before the planet was discovered 
enabling him to have de re attitudes towards it, to Nathan Salmon. As I have argued in my (1997), if this is 
correct, it also undermines Donnellan’s argument against Kripke on the possibility of having contingent a 
priori truths. 
10 On similar grounds Quine (1979) and Sosa (1975) concluded that the de re/de dicto distinction is a 
pragmatic distinction having no or little philosophical significance.  I have argued in length against this 
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